The Dangerous Art of Investigative Journalism

People hold portraits of killed journalist Pavel Sheremet as they gather to commemorate him in Kiev, Ukraine, Wednesday, July 20, 2016. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

Exactly one week ago, at 7:45am on a normal Wednesday morning, a car bomb blew up in the car of a well-known Belarusian-Russian journalist Pavel Sheremet, killing the driver. Who was behind the murder has remained a mystery so far: some point to the involvement of Russian security forces, others to Ukrainian nationalists, some believe the murder was in no way connected to Sheremet’s professional activism as a journalist – or that, in fact, the bomb was meant to kill his partner, the owner of Ukrainian Pravda newspaper Olena Prytula. Whatever the motive behind the killing, one thing remains a fact: engaging in in investigative journalism in former Soviet Union is dangerous business. Sheremet, who in 2002 received the OSCE prize for journalism and democracy, was a determined journalist who was willing to risk his life for a truth despite numerous attempts that were made throughout the years to silence him.

To put Sheremet’s death in a perspective, let’s have a closer look at the widespread persecution of journalists in the region. The most famous case of the recent years is, without doubt, the murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006. Politkovskaya had been investigating human right violations in Chechnya during and after the second Chechen war and vehemently opposing the Chechen authorities’ and president Putin’s policy in the republic. She was shot outside her Moscow apartment. Three Chechens supposedly responsible for the murder were caught and sentenced to imprisonment in 2014, but whoever paid $150,000 for the killing was never found. Some independent commentators, including the later poisoned former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, argue that the murder was orchestrated by the Kremlin.

In Sheremet’s native Belarus, independent journalism has been a dangerous activity for most of the post-Soviet era. In the early 1990s, Sheremet was working as an anchor and producer for Prospekt, the first news analysis programme on Belarusian state TV. The then newly-elected president Lukashenka banned the programme in 1995, but Sheremet continued working for other media outlets. In 1997 he made a report for the Russian TV channel ORT about smuggling. To prove his point about how the Belarus-Lithuanian border was not as well-guarded as it should be, the journalist himself managed to illegally cross the border. It should be noted that at the time Lukashenka was running a big publicity campaign about border security which was completely discredited by Sheremet’s report. The journalist was arrested, imprisoned for three months and deported – only after Russia and president Yeltsin personally had put heavy diplomatic pressure on Belarus to release him. Although after this incident Sheremet could no longer work in Belarus, he established an independent media outlet Belarusian partisan that continued to resist the regime’s crackdown on free speech. Since the 1990s, several Belarusian journalists have gone missing or died under questionable circumstances. Even more have faced prison or beaten up by unknown thugs. For example, in 2000 Sheremet’s cameraman Dmitry Zavadsky that had participated in the 1997 smuggling report disappeared on his way to the airport to meet Sheremet. As confirmed by a 2012 report of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Belarus was one of the most hostile countries for reporters to work in.

Controlling media outlets is an important part of managing the information space of a sovereign state. In liberal democracies, freedom of speech and freedom of press are considered vital. Yet a certain level of control exists in these countries as well because hate speech – the dark side of free speech – is a criminal act. Having said that, information management is more prominent and typical of hybrid and authoritarian states as one of the means of the ruling regime to stay in power. It is considered a necessary safety procedure to enhance political stability. Investigative journalists that are engaged in exposing the shortcomings of the regime are problematic because they are sources of uncontrolled information and often contrasting the official public discourse. Corruption, human rights abuses, tax fraud and unjust treatment of citizens are topics that emerge in the work of investigative journalists around the world. As a result of scandalous exposures formerly powerful members of political and business elites are sometimes forced to resign and face criminal changes. If one has the means to avoid such a fate, they will try to pursue it. There is a number of ways to “get off the hook”: Firstly, one can take pre-emptive measures and try to intimidate or bribe the journalist. Secondly, one can try to limit the potential audience of the leak: publicly discredit the journalist or block access to the news portal. Thirdly, if the damage is already done, one can learn a lesson and try to avoid further leaks by (a) engaging all the measures listed above, and (b) make sure that those who were responsible for the leak (journalist / media outlet) are punished, thus setting the example for others engaging in similar activities.

It seems to me that many political commentators do not quite understand how important it is for ambitious (usually non-democratic) leaders to maintain control over the sphere of information and, thus, how far they are ready to go to silence independent voices. For them, it is a question of state security – or, to be more precise, regime security. While in a democratic regime the scandal only discredits those directly involved in it, in a non-democracy with a hierarchical power vertical structure, scandals affect all those in power. A minor blow can be devastating to the political system. For example: Yanukovich refusing to sign the European Union Association Agreement was a small thing, really, but is acted as a catalyst to a series of events that ended up totally changing the political structure of Ukraine. Likewise, a scandalous report by an investigative journalist could become a spark that set the hell loose – whether in Russia, Belarus or Ukraine.

Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians have been actively discussing who’s behind Sheremet’s murder for a week now. The first big question is whether the journalist was murdered due to his professional activity or for personal reasons. The second one is –if we assume this was indeed a political killing, target of which was either Sheremet or his partner Prytula–, of course, who orchestrated the murder. Some blame Russian security services (“they have done these kinds of things before”), others Ukrainian far-right extremist/s (“a Russian journalist criticising Ukrainian government is a threat to our national security”). Some point a finger at oligarchs or organised crime (“perhaps they were working on a scandalous report on some mafia businessman”), others remember Lukashenka’s personal hatred of the journalist.

While the motive of the murder is still uncertain, some Ukrainian commentators have accurately pointed out one thing: at this stage it is of upmost importance that the Ukrainian police will find those responsible and make sure they face justice. Criminal acts have consequences – and this is a litmus test for the post-Maidan Ukraine to prove a point about it. Journalists must feel that they are safe, and criminals must feel that their deeds will not go unpunished.

Ramzan Kadyrov: the man and the media

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov announces about a reality TV show in order to find himself a new personal assistant and head of Chechen Strategic Development Agency

Ramzan Kadyrov is one of the most controversial leaders in contemporary Russia. In fact, he might just be the only regional leader that is as well-known as president Putin, having lead the Chechen Republic with an iron fist since 2004. Known for his ardent support for Putin and extreme dislike of human rights’ organizations, Kadyrov recently confirmed he was going to take part in the upcoming elections to continue as head of republic. There had been rumours that after Kadyrov was unofficially found responsible to the opposition leader Boris Nemtsov’s shooting in February 2015, Putin wanted him to step down from office. However, this turned out not to be the case as the ruling United Russia party nominated Kadyrov as its candidate to run in the upcoming September elections. This means that Kadyrov will likely continue to lead the Chechen Republic for another four years at least. (As long as he’s not assassinated by anti-regime rebels like his father, the Republic’s first president, Akhmad Kadyrov, of course.)

One of the reasons why Kadyrov is so well-known around the world is his media-savviness. He posts to his Instagram account several times a day and is followed by 1.9 million users around the world, using hash tags and publicly replying to people who write about him. He also has a LiveJournal blog. Second reason for his popularity is that he often shares thoughts and pictures of his private life and says things that most politicians would find too daring or politically incorrect (for example, about Turkey). His newest media trick is starring a reality TV series called Team (in Russian Komanda) the aim of which is to find him an assistant. The TV series follows the format of Donald Trump’s The Apprentice, in which participants face challenges after which the weakest player is eliminated. Those willing to “influence the future of Russia and the Chechen Republic” are asked to send in their applications until July 22. In the online application form candidates are asked to share their vision for the future strategic development of Chechnya and upload a short video about themselves and their skills.

For anyone knowing about Kadyrov’s infamous way to lead the Republic, this just seems like a step too far, even for Russia. Is this even a legitimate way to recruit high-ranking public administration officials? (The winner will also become the head of the Chechen Republic’s Strategic Development Agency.) This seems just too crazy. Even for Russia. Even for Chechnya. Even for Kadyrov.

But then I watched the first episode of the new series, in which Kadyrov tells about his everyday life as the Republic’s head and shares his expectations about the new assistant. In fact, Kadyrov seems like quite a nice guy with boyish charm. The TV presenter starts the show: “This is Grozny. The symbol of what Russia can achieve if it really wants to. In just a few years after devastating years of war, an oasis is in the making. How did they manage to do it?” The spectators follow him and the presenter to the mountains, to his second cousin’s wedding, a intimate evening with friends. We listen to Kadyrov’s stories about his assassinated father, his proposal to his wife, how he solved republican crisis during Putin’s address to regional leaders. Kadyrov speaks in Russian with a noticeable Caucasian accent, using simple vocabulary. Yes, he seems like a laid-back “people’s leader”, easily approachable with a good sense of humour. This is the “other Ramzan” Kadyrov wants Russians in other parts of the federation to meet: a strong but fair leader that wants best for his country. But is Kadyrov the reality TV star strong enough to overcome the image of Kadyrov the Caucasian dictator?

5-year planning in contemporary Belarus

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Dear friends,

After a few years’ pause I have decided to start blogging again. The plan is to keep it simple and current, and to write not only about Russia but about all states of Former Soviet Union and post-Communist Europe. Today’s story is about Belarus, the “black hole on the map of Europe”, or the “last European dictatorship”. There has been a lot going on in Belarus during the last few months – rapprochement with the EU, the 5th People’s Congress, currency denomination and minor gas disputes with Russia, National dress (vyshyvanka) Day and Independence Day (just to name a few). Today I would like to write a few words about the 5th People’s Congress, a special event designed by president Lukashenka that is organised every five years to discuss and determine the five-year plan (!) of Belarus’ economic and societal development.

“People’s Congress is a truly functioning mechanism of people’s power”
– A. G. Lukashenka

The first All-Belarussian People’s Congress was organised in 1996 on the initiative of president Lukashenka. Its official aim was to include all layers of society to, first, participate in an open debate about Belarus’ future, and, second, to draft a plan of this preferred future development. Since then, the Congress has been called by the president every five years in 2001, 2006, 2011 and this year on June 22–23 and it has become one of those special elements of Belarusian people’s democracy. During the event, representatives of different societal groups deliver speeches on what has been done during the last piatiletka (5-year period) and what should be during the next one in order to meet the ultimate goal, i.e. the consolidation of a strong and prosperous Belarus. Each well-prepared speech is followed by a well-prepared commentary from president Alexander Grigorievich, either approving or critisising the speaker’s proposition. The 2,500 delegates present in the room listen attentatively and stern-lookingly and applause when appropriate.

While the idea of the Congress is perhaps good (more inclusive decision-making, more legitimacy?), its realisation is somewhat flawed. Firstly, there is no actual debating during the event since every speech has been double checked and rehersed in beforehand. Secondly, the plan of future development has already been drafted (why whom? on what grounds?) so the delegates only vote for or against it in the end of the two-day congress. Thirdly, voting is merely a performed formality. The voting committee doesn’t count the votes that are cast if there is a clear majority of those voting in favour – and this happens 99% of the time. Finally, although after the Congress delegates are supposed to return to their regions and tell local people what the new plan is and work tirelessly to fulfil the new plan, they couldn’t actually give a proper account of the event to the journalist asking about it.

Vertical representative democracy

In fact, People’s Congress is a perfect manifestation of Belarusian sovereign (rather than liberal) democracy in practice. A big element of such system is vertical representitativeness: peoples’ delegates are elected (often de facto appointed) at regional levels. All major state-owned companies, factories and farms, public entities as well as some state-supported organisations are allowed to nominate their representatives who, for their part, nominate their representatives for the next administrative level higher up. There are three or four rounds of elections. Thus, instead of individuals electing individuals to the People’s Congress, it’s people electing people electing people electing the Belarusian people’s representation. Moreover, sometimes the process goes vice versa, with the higher level appointing representatives for the lower level. Typically representative elections have pre-drawn lists of candidates that people vote either for or against.

Vertical democratic representation is a present in all areas of life. Self-governing bodies of organisations, companies and public sector entities are mostly built this way. In the ideal world the structure would allow people at lower levels to be easily heard at higher levels – instead of writing an official letter to the director, they could just have a casual chat with their peer representative who would pass the message on. However, due to the top-down nature of management, it is more common that the higher level representative tells the lower level rep what needs to be done rather than the other way around. The challenge is, of course, how to find a balance between bottom-up and top-down communication & management. (Or, if we’re anarchists, how to deconstruct the current hierarcial societal model.)

Continuity and change: Planned evolution from Soviet Union to a sovereign welfare state

Many foreignersthat come to Belarus, including Russians, are struck by the parallels between the former Soviet state and today’s independent Belarus. Architecture has remained the same it was 25 years ago, the streets are clean, there are very few commercial billboards. The KGB is still called the KGB, kolkhozy are stil up and running, there is a relatively small gap between the rich and the poor, the state allocates young professionals their first jobs, men serve two years in the army. Streets still bear the names of Lenin, Marx, Engels, the October revolution, Komsomol and internationalism. Very few have had the chance to travel abroad. Apart from downtown Minsk, time seems to have set still.

Belarus was one of the first post-Soviet states to turn away from liberalism in the 1990s. Privatisation of state assets never took place and the government has ardently opposed any radical solutions to introduce structural reforms. Current leadership sees China as a good example of evolutionary change from state socialism to something I would call statist socialism. This means that the socialist welfare regime and state control in the private sector must be perserved while only the best elements of capitalism and liberal democracy be implemented. State sovereignty –whatever that means– and political stability are of upmost importance.

So what was the conclusion of the People’s Congress? What is Belarus’ plan of action for the next five years? Is it really to get naked and toil away? Well, the plan indeed seems to be the same as the Soviet Stakhanovites had: to work harder, produce more export goods, and use the money to raise living standards. The economic situation in Belarus has been getting worse and worse ever since the 2009 financial crisis and there seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel for now. What seems to be seen is how much of a difference the event will make after all.

Where there is war, there are refugees

A flag of the Donetsk People’s Republic in Arkhangel’sk, Russia

Today I plan to write about refugees. Or to be more precise: about the Eastern Ukrainian citizens that have been forced to leave their homes and seek a better future in Russia proper. As I was strolling on the seaside of Arkhangel’sk, I met a young man that introduced himself as Mikhail (name changed), a refugee from Ukraine. Until then I had been rather critical of these so-called refugees. Have they really been forced out of their homes or had they decided to leave Ukraine to find a better life? The question of Ukrainian refugees had been left largely unaddressed by the Western media and even some of my acquaintances in St. Petersburg treated them simply as tourists or “normal” migrant workers. The Russian media and the refugees themselves, however, stick to the explanation that they were forced to leave. A friend of mine from Tver’ told about dozens of pregnant women that had fled the battle despite their condition. Both the Russian public and the Russian authorities are trying their best to support these people; they have received work permits and can apply to social benefits just like the citizens of the Russian Federation.

According to the UN, refugees are “people whose lives have been torn apart when violence arrives on their doorstep or when they are persecuted for their religious or political beliefs”. Migrants, on the other hand, have chosen to move in order to improve the future prospects for themselves and their families. It is fairly difficult to classify the Ukrainians, because, while their lives have definitely been shattered by violence in which they have played no part in, I am determined that some of them have decided to seize the chance to emigrate to a better-off Russia for financial reasons. While they are not persecuted for their religious or political beliefs as such, they have indeed been trapped between a bloody conflict in their very own backyards. But let me tell you about Mikhail.

Mikhail left Dnepropetrovsk, his home city in East Central Ukraine, in June, to avoid military service in the Ukrainian army. He was studying at a local university of technology when the head of department received a letter demanding a part of the  students to “volunteer” for military service in the infamous anti-terrorist operation against the insurgents in Eastern Ukraine. Mikhail was sure he’d be conscripted. Since he had a strong Russian identity (that’s right, he refers himself as russkiy) he couldn’t even consider endangering his life for the Kiev junta. He left his home at once, travelled to his relatives in Arkhangelsk and told me he’d only consider returning if Dnepropetrovsk becomes part of Russian Federation. In fact, he revealed he was considering joining the Russian army as a professional.

Mihkail didn’t use to care much about politics but events starting from Maidan have completely changed his views. He is determined that the U.S. is behind the crisis in Ukraine. He told me he’d, too, got an offer to “work” in Maidan in the early days of the protest. The pay would be $100 a day, including food and accommodation on the square. In fact, he recalled, the Orange revolution of 2004 had been a U.S. conspiracy as well, but at that time the residents of Eastern Ukraine had decided to stay calm and not get involved as long as they wouldn’t be disturbed themselves. This time it would pass as well, he thought. And the whole wave of “support” for Maidan was a sham as well. A handful of Ukrainian “activists” (= local neo-Nazis) had organised a pro-Maidan support in the city centre, and in the very next morning the statue of Lenin had disappeared. Why at night? Because they would never had managed to do it in the daylight, their asses would have been kicked.

All of a sudden Mikhail switches to fluent Ukrainian. He’s decided to check how much I can understand. I am well impressed by how well he can speak it. He shrugs and says that they learn it as at school. Although he went to a school in Russian, all higher education institutes are only allowed to teach in Ukrainian. Which is insane, if you ask him. Everyone he knows speaks Russian. Fair enough, he’s got one friend that speaks Ukrainian at home, but everytime he gets drunk he switches to Russian. In fact, Ukraine is an artificial country, he declares. “Belarusians and Eastern Ukrainians are a part of the Russian nation. Those who played along to Maidan were in fact extremist Eastern Poles.”

Perhaps that’s also why he gets angry at me when I refer to the Eastern Ukrainian freedom fighters as “separatists”. According to him, they cannot be called separatists because they are trying to reunite, not separate. Besides, they are not the active force behind the Ukrainian crisis; they merely react to the declaration of war from the Kiev Fascist junta. It is the new government that should be considered as “separatist”, for it is them that want to separate from the historical mother-Russia. The people of Novorossiya simply defend historic continuation. It is only natural that they object to the attempt of artificially implement European values in Ukraine. Just like many Russians, he is furious of doing this in the name of so-called “democracy”. The dictatorship of the minority is a better name for it! All kinds of pedophiles and homosexuals should not be walking down our streets, luring our children! “I remember reading an article about it, there’s some country in Europe where pedophilia is de facto legal, there’s no mention of it in the legislation…”

I asked Mikhail who he thought would win the war: the central government or the pro-Russian forces. He remained quiet for a while. “I don’t know, in depends on too many factors… but one thing I know for sure: Russia never loses!”

We separated in good terms. Talking with him had really helped me understand the Ukrainian case better. I was now determined that the Ukrainian nation-building had failed miserably in the East of the country. It occurred to me that not only Europeans and Americans, but also Ukrainians themselves had been truly blind to the actual state of their society. In addition, they had managed appallingly badly the public sphere of information. In fact, I could identify with Mikhail. I wouldn’t want to fight a war against my own people either, in an army run by alienated dickheads.

As the Ukrainian crisis prolongs, I have also thought about the real price of the war. Maybe the West should consider agreeing to the birth of two breakaway republics, after all. Maybe Ukraine would be better off without its Eastern part. Fine, maybe not – it would prove once and for all that Putin has the power to take what he wants. And that’s a price too high to pay considering the future of Europe.

Impressions from the other side of the front

Last week I decided to spend a week in Russia, a little trip that was easily organised given my long summer holiday and a flexible visa. Today I will write about general impressions from St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk, whereas next time I will focus on the issue of Ukrainian refugees. Completely surprisingly I happened to meet a young student from Dnepropetrovsk, himself a refugee struggling to adapt to a new life in the Russian north. But today I will write about the Ukrainian crisis as Russian media and my Russian friends see it.

Perhaps it’s the perfect summer weather, perhaps the over-the-top propaganda of Russian media… For some reason, my closest friends that had in the past been fairly well updated on world affairs and Russian domestic political issues had simply decided to isolate themselves from the public news stream. One of them had completely missed the news about the unfortunate Malaysian airplane. Another one had actively tried to avoid speaking about the Ukrainian situation and focus mainly on her personal life. As we began to chat more about the crisis, they both expressed deep, underlying frustration about the conflict between Russia and “the West”. They said they had once again disappointed in the way Russian authorities had dealt with the issue and had decided to stop thinking about this “lost case” and, instead, focus on the things in life they could have an impact on, the things that would call positive rather than negative emotions. They were surprised that I had paid so much attention to the crisis and we concluded that, generally, I might have too much free time in my hands just now. Both of them seemed to have had enough of the exhausting battle against the mad political forces. Aleksey was saying that things had got a lot worse since the start of the conflict in spring and that the systematic brain-washing in the media had taken its toll in the general public: even his parents, intellectual people, had began to believe in the theory that Russia was surrounded by enemies; that the crisis in Ukraine was in fact a grand plot of the U.S.; etc.

Given my the enormous pressure on public opinion in Russia today, I can understand his choice. When people experience mixed emotions and uncertainty about facts, they are open to a conversation and ready to consider alternative explanations and theories to current events. When no plurality of “truth” exists, there is no foundation to any change in opinions. It is very difficult to argue with people who are absolutely sure they know what’s going on. After dozens of such pointless debates – arguments in which both people are in principle set in their opinion – one stops trying. And decides to focus on something more worthwhile. While both me and Aleksey agreed that Russia was assisting the Ukrainian separatists considerably, we disagreed on the grounds why it was doing so. I was trying to convince him it was due the profound identity crisis that the post-colonial Russian MPs (and their supporters) were experiencing. Aleksey was determined they were simply idiots; incompetent fools that had lost touch with reality.

I also decided to analyse how the anti-Russian sanctions and the escalating Ukrainian crisis were discussed in the local press. First in line was the approachable newspaper Argumenty i Fakty, a fairly popular weekly paper that according to its motto, “explains what’s going on”. Their sizable article about the sanctions can be summarised in the conclusion that the sanctions would prove to be more harmful to EU itself than Russia. The style of writing and the quality of arguments was such to please the “common people”: simple and effortless. Instead of a profound complex analysis there were somewhat “lighter” articles about health and cuisine. As a side note I must say I am a little bit worried about the state of Russian printed press. On the train journey from Arkhangelsk to St. Petersburg I got off at one station and tried to find a decent newspaper. The task turned out to be more demanding that I had expected. The only thing the newsagents had to offer, was an old copy of AiF, which I refused as well as a couple of journals focusing on the personal life drama of Russian celebrities. As it turns out, small town Russians simply don’t shop news journals?! Those who are interested enough, read news in the Internet (29% of Russians, according to a recent study conducted by FOM), while 87% turn on the telly (and, ehm, 63% of them refer to the state-run Channel 1). While the message of Channel 1 is clear, even those Russians accessing information in the Internet face challenges in finding a diverse outlook. While Ekho Moskvy is commonly known as the opposition-affiliated news portal, there is a real lack of truly professional news portals that would aim at presenting diverse, complex news analyses. Having said that, I was positively surprised by the quality of the articles in Kommersant vlast’. While the Russian public with its fixed opinions might be difficult to please, I felt that the journal had managed to find a balance quite well – they hadn’t not gone entirely anti-establishment like Novaya gazeta but had managed to present at least somewhat complex and critical view on current events.

Signs of the very anti-Western silovik strand was also well presented in both St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk. A good collection of different biographies and political fiction books about the leaders of the Ukrainian separatists, or, should I say, freedom fighters, was spotted in the bookshop Bukvoyed in the heart of St. Petersburg. The sensational books, neatly lined up on the stand had titles such as “What if tomorrow was war. The Arab spring and Russia.”, “Syria, Libya, next Russia”, “Information war against Russia”, “Defense of Donbass. Igor Strelkov, the terror of Bandera’s junta”, “Euromaidan in the name of Stepan Bandera. From democracy to dictatorship” and “Crisi$ – how it’s done” and “Geopoitics – how it’s done”.

Starikov’s new hit: “Ukraine. Chaos and revolution – the guns of d$llar”

To conclude, I would like to share with you an excerpt of an article, published in a newspaper called Spravedlivaya gazeta, A Just Newspaper, under a headline “War and peace” (as pictured above):

World War III: USA against Russia

The famous Italian journalist, a former member of the European Parliament Julietto Quiesa is determined that the third world war has already begun, and that Russia should seriously think about her defense. Quiesa believes that russophobia has lately not been developed in Europe and USA by coincidence. They have also joined in media to fool Europeans and Americans. It is a sign that a war is being prepared against Russia.

Because of the Italian press, all 60 million Italians are certain that Russia has occupied Ukraine.

Quiesa explains that the European Commission and other EU structures together with the US organised the coup in Kiev, and now all gas structures lie in the hands of the USA. “A war about gas and energy resources will begin. What is happening is a real attack”, Quiesa says.

Ukraine’s former minister of domestic affairs, Yuri Lutsenko, talks about privatisation of the gas pipeline and Chevron Corporation’s offer to “buy everything”. “If that happens, the tap of Ukrainian and Russian gas will be in America. Them president Obama will come to Europe and say ‘And now we’ll supply you with our gas, we’ve got gas”, he explains.

But gas is Russian, after all. How could they have forgotten about such “minor detail”? The US has simply assigned it in beforehand.

Obama is planning a nuclear attack against Russia

…

Why is Eastern Ukraine so important

Time to return my name, I am not South-East, I am New Russia!

Today, after a week of hard drafting work, the EU and US have revealed new sanctions against Russia. As we know, they are designed to target key industries and business elites, supporting president Putin. The Russians have expressed both their disappointment and their indifference to the sanctions. This, they argue, will give them a chance to invest in local production and sustainability within Russia. Typically, the Russian consumer rights watchdog Rosselkhoznadzor has banned fruit and vegetable import from Poland as a response to the sanctions (well, not officially as a response to them, but the Russian hygiene board has used its power to take revenge in similar situations in the past. I guess the strong support Polish politicians have shown both to the Euromaidan movement and the new Ukrainian government has something to do with the timing). As you might guess, 50% or Polish apples go to export to Russia; thus the ban will be quite a blow to the Polish economy.

What I’ve been thinking about, however, is why on earth does Putin support the separatists in Novorossiya, “New Russia” as the breakaway regions in Eastern Ukraine are called these days? I can understand the military and emotional importance of the Crimea which was indeed incorporated into the Federation quickly, painlessly and efficiently in the blink of an eye. But why invest so much money, resources and international prestige over a strip of land in Eastern Ukraine, given that there was no plan to incorporate the region fully to Russia proper? Why cover up for separatists that are losing the civil war and, allegedly, shooting down passenger planes by accident? Why let trade relations with the West deteriorate now that Russia’s economy is already struggling? Luckily, Russia’s self-proclaimed geopolitics guru №1, Alexandr Dugin, is here to explain. However, I should point out he is not the official spokesman of the Kremlin. Only it happens that very similar perspective was promoted at Seliger Youth Forum last year.

According to Dugin, Ukraine is an important piece on the chessboard between the U.S. and Russia in the game of world domination. The piece was temporarily lost to the West in the 1990s, but Russia has managed to play the game so well it has recaptured the Crimea and is making headway to getting all of Ukraine under its influence once again. According to Dugin, Novorossiya righteously belongs to the Russian sphere of influence because the region’s population is both Orthodox and Russian-speaking. Perhaps Dugin’s way of thinking is alien to me just because I don’t see myself as a citizen of a great world superpower. I wonder if this explanation makes more sense to Americans or Britons? Is the world they see also divided between superpowers and “their” territories?

Judging by the course of Russian foreign policy in the latter half of the 2000s, the idea of Russia as a geopolitical superpower has become stronger and stronger. That is why being economically dependent on the West – unlike China – is so unpleasant to Putin. The new sanctions, imposed by the EU and the US today, could help him wriggle out of the dependency relationship, or at least give the first push towards a profound structural reform. The most logical way Russia can react to the sanctions is to restrict or even ban import of goods from the West. This would then force Russian consumers to support local businesses, which again could lead to the development and modernisation of local production and a higher level of self-sustainability. As far as I know, the Kremlin’s so-called patriotic wing of economic analysts would be happy to opt for isolationism and see, for example, Russia’s WTO membership as a constraint that holds back the modernisation of local industries. However, a colossal amount of investment would be necessary to bring about such extensive structural change in the economy. It is more likely that Putin will try and tackle the issue gradually, over decades rather than months.

Instead of focusing on internal issues, Putin has decided to engage in consolidating Russian control over the “near abroad” – i.e. the post-Soviet countries, its legitimate sphere of influence. Officially Russia has not admitted sending troops and weapons to Novorossiya. However, no-one – not even Russians themselves – seems to doubt Russia’s “equalising” role in the conflict. A few days ago I stumbled across a small article that discusses the transportation of war technology from Chechnya to the breakaway regions via Rostov. It seems obvious that the separatists could not have managed to wage war against the Ukrainian forces for so long if it wasn’t for Russia’s aid. This is why Western leaders hold Russia responsible for the escalation of the conflict. Russia, on the other hand, holds the West responsible for the beginning of the whole civil war, for it was them who supported the Euromaidan movement that escalated into a coup d’etat.

The kitchen psychologist inside me believes that one of the reasons why Putin and the nationalist group of Russian political elites want to see the Ukrainian separatists triumph is because they want to humiliate Ukrainian’s new leadership. It is their personal revenge on all those who gathered to Maidan square to protest for closer ties with Europe (read: to protest against Russia). They want to show the West that they really have the power to bring about great damage if they decide to do so. In the ideal world Poroshenko would come to his senses, think of what’s best for his people and team up with Russia once again. They would work together for a strong Eurasian union and everyone would be happy ever after. Perhaps Ukraine would even get the Crimea back after 50 years of good conduct.

If Ukraine will reject the harmonic relationship with Russia, she will be forced to put up with a troublesome buffer quasi-state between herself and Russia. A kind of second Transnistria, a region that has de facto independence under the protecting wings of Russia. Just like Transnistria has developed into a domestic nightmare for Moldavia, Novorossiya could develop into one for Ukraine. (Also, as the poor Moldavia has come to realise, the EU is very reluctant to collaborate with countries with such weak economies and internal conflicts.)

Even if Putin, unsettled by the new sanctions, decided to withdraw Russian aid from the separatists, he would have to do so on the quiet. The Malaysian plane crash brought the Ukrainian conflict to the world’s attention in a way he would not have wished. The only way to save his own and Russia’s face was to plead “not guilty” before the eyes of the international public. This is also why Russia cannot openly admit aiding the Ukrainian separatists – if they are found guilty of shooting down the plane, it will be a huge blow for the Russian government as the official sponsor of the movement and for Putin personally as the omnipotent head of state. As we know, with great power comes great responsibility. If Putin, such a powerful hero-figure as he is, in this or some other way brings disgrace to Russia (like Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the most hated men in Russia), his popularity would sink and problems would begin.

The prolongation of the crisis, the plane crash and the worsening trade relations with the West must have made the Russian elites wonder whether Novorossiya is really worth the battle. If you ask Mr Dugin, it probably is. But both Putin and the Russian business elites are more pragmatic than he is. If they come to the conclusion that they’re playing a price too high, they’ll find a way out. Perhaps the Russian Secret Services will find out that the separatists have been secretly co-operating with Ukrainian ultra-nationalists? Or that the top leaders of the movement have been embezzling humanitarian aid from Russia?

Information war from the Russian perspective

Ever since the Ukrainian crisis started, the relations between myself and my Russian friends have suffered quite a bit. Depending on the person, we have either agreed not to talk about politics, wrangled every time we are in contact (but still remain friendly to each other, underlining that we have nothing against each other personally), or stopped speaking to each other after yet another row about who’s lying the most – Russians or “the West”. The Malaysian plane crash has only made it worse, with Russians blaming Ukraine (and the U.S.) about the catastrophe; and Western media pro-Russian rebels (and Putin). Although I generally consider the people I am in close terms with both intelligent and and skillful critical thinkers, I am finding it more and more difficult to find a common language with them. It is because at the moment they are not only critical of the Russian national TV and its ouvertly “Western-looking” counterparts like BBC Russia and Golos Ameriky, but every single media outlet. In short, they have stopped believing in objective journalism. They are determined that every journalist, regardless of their background or media affiliation, is a puppet of their emplyer. As a good friend of mine pondered the other day, “even the so-called independent journalists must be paid by someone…”. The current Russian public is certain, that everyone can be bought: the news anchor of RT who resigned on air a few days ago (obviously the Americans just paid her more!), members of the research team that are trying to find out what happened to the plane that was shot down (“obviously they want to prove it was the pro-Russian rebels who did it!), et cetera. In essence, the Russian public are growing more and more prone to believing in all kinds of conspiracy theories.

In the heads of millions of Russians the current situation in world politics looks like this: “The West”, lead by the United States and her allies (including the EU and UN and) have launched an information war against Russia. The aim of the war is to discredit Russia in all possible ways and portray it as a tyrannic and stagnated state. By doing so, citizens of those countries that used to be close allies of Russia (Georgia, Ukraine, etc.) become more and more negative and aggressive of Russia and Russians and, in the end, financed by the West, stage a coup d’etat, a so-called “colour revolution” and gain power. Russia’s influence in the world decreases and she will become weak – an easy prey for Western state-linked corporations that want to gain control over Russia’s rich natural resources. If this happens, Russia will be humiliated and stripped off all her righteous former glory. The Russian people will be forced to live in poverty, as slaves to the foreign countries, feeling ashamed of their Russianness.

According to the Russian experts, the information war started in the end of 1990s, when the Russian state had recovered from the chaotic Yeltsin period. Putin’s era has seen the Russian state growing gradually stronger and stronger, with Russian leaders becoming more independent of foreign companies and taking an active role in world politics. The elites are trying really hard to nurture a feeling of patriotism and national pride among the masses. Judging from the psychological viewpoint, painting the picture of a common enemy works more than well. However, I am beginning to think that the public’s attitude towards all media employees as potential brain-washing hit men is bringing out some schizofrenic attributes in average, peace-loving Russians. They feel the ever-present threat of the blood-thirsty Western imperialists. They feel like they can’t trust anything anyone says – who knows, maybe even their close friends or relatives are working for the other side. At the same time they are painfully aware of what is being said about Russia in Western media; things they really don’t want to believe because personally they are very fond of their country, its history and traditions. On the other hand they look around them and see poverty, exhausted fellow citizens, people who are tired of trying to make ends meet.

I discovered a fascinating website that describes the anti-Russian information war in detail (unfortunately available only in Russian). It states that the successful information war has lead to enormous gains for the West. The site includes a list of both Russian and international organisations as well as individuals that have either striken a deal with the imperialists or fallen victims to their brain-washing. Russian opposition activists, Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch and even surprising names, such as Karl Marx make the list of russophobes. What is interesting, is the re-emergence of very powerful words such as “russophobe”, “fascist” or “fifth column” in the everyday liguistic environment. Many Russians today are sure that Ukrainians are a nation of russophobe fascists. Such projection of the Soviet-era Slavic brothers is in stark contrast to both the reality and the Russian portrayal of Ukrainians only ten years ago. In addition to Ukrainians, also Georgians have gone from friends to enemies almost overnight. I wonder whether Serbs will get the same treatment if/when the country decides to embark on a road of closer collaboration with the West?

According to the official story, the Western anti-Russian information war is designed to isolate Russia and Russians from the rest of the world. What they seem to have missed is, however, the immediate isolating effect that has followed the Kremlin’s vigorous campaign against the “Western propaganda”. Even Angela Merkel famously complained that president Putin seemed to be “living in another world”. More than anything, this is a result of believing in the global international information war. It is blurring the line between fiction and reality (as a sidenote, did you hear about the theory that MH17 was, in fact, filled with corpses?), and leaving people feeling scared and paranoid as they believe they’re constantly under threat. Conspiracy theories mushroom and people reach the state where they refuse to trust anyone.

Needless to say, co-operating with such people is extremely difficult. This is why Russia–West relations have been going downhill for a good time. This is also why I believe the sanctions against Russia won’t work; in contrary, they will be used as yet another example for the Russian people, proving that the whole world is against them. Indeed, they ask, why is it that the West turns a blind eye to China’s human rights violations, not even to mention about the crimes Israel commits in Gaza? Why are they so keen to point out Russia’s shortcomings from the Sochi olympics to environmental issues? Why do they deliberately want to weaken Russia’s economy?

For them, the answer is simple: they are anti-Russian imperialists, that want to gain over Russia and her oil and gas. To let you check how brain-washed by anti-Russian propaganda you are yourselves, here’s a list of the most common lies, spreaded by the russophobe camp:

1. Russia is miserable and shameful. (Everything from Russia is of bad quality. Life in Russia is agony.)
2. West is better than Russia (more civilised, better developed, etc.)
3. Patriotism is for idiots (modern citizens should see themselves as independent world citizens)
4. Everything in Russia is getting worse (if nothing changes, e.g. a drastic political change towards Western-style liberal “democracy”)
5. Russia has no enemies. (The Cold War has ended and the biggest enemy of Russia is Russia herself)
6. The Russian ruling elites are illegitimate idiots who only care about their own bank accounts.
7. A new revolution is necessary in Russia (to get rid of the old elites for good and start afresh).
8. The state is our enemy (and anyone who works for the state is probably a corrupt bastard).
9. The Orthodox religion is bad (because it’s exacly why Russia has remained such a backward country)
10. Russia for Russians. (Which is why Russia should retreat from Caucasus and allow Chechen independence.)

The two sides of Russia

I shall attempt to say a few words about Seliger – the “educational forum” as it is officially called, and “pro-Kremlin youth camp” as the English-speaking media usually refers to the event. I was lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time: arriving at the third shift “Civic forum”, I found myself surrounded by the Kremlin’s official discourse for ten days. Attending lectures with the members of youth organisations and collecting data for my dissertation was an extremely interesting experience and I gained good insight to what’s going on in the heads of the future leaders of Russia.

Future leaders, of course, taking that there will be no major changes in the political status-quo.

The forum was in fact a vigorous attempt of top-down nation-building and strenthgening of the Russian national identity. In a multi-ethnic country like Russia shaping a common identity for everyone is a lot more demanding than in small mono-ethnic nation states. Yet I think they’re doing quite well, although apart from promoting the “we”-feeling the Kremlin ideologists are pushing the “other”-component a bit more than I would want to. The participants of Seliger actually formed an image of ideal Russia: a band people who are all different but yet patriotic, active and immune to American propaganda.

How was the positive “we”-feeling created? By lots and lots of exposure to pro-Russian propaganda. Russia was constantly referred to as the strongest, the best, the most cultured, in short the most amazing country in the world. The camp radio was playing mostly patriotic pop and every morning we woke up to the lovely sound of the Russian national anthem. The lectures were also designed to develop our national pride, e.g. my reminding us about the Great Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Some historical figures were praised, others discredited. I was surprised to find out that Stalin is now considered as one of the “good guys” because of the immense progress throughout the 1930s and in WWII. Lenin, instead, is one of the anti-patriots because the Russian Empire collapsed and millions of people died in the Civil War because of him.

The negative “the others” -feeling was created by promoting the idea that the U.S. and, in fact, every country in the Western world wants to see Russia crumble and collapse. The theories of managed chaos and the war of information were promoted outragiously and anyone who claimed to even suggest that the Baltic States did not join the USSR out of their own free will were objected not only by the lecturer-historian but also by the fellow participants. If an Americal had stumbled to the camp site he would have at best deported as a spy, decapitated at worst.

That’s the major issue with patriotism – it can easily cross the line and become hateful ultranationalism. Although most participants were extremely lovely and positive, there was a lot of hate and negative emotions in the air. Surely it morepleasant to believe that the Soviet Union collapsed because of an external force: the decade-long bombarding of U.S. intelligence, rather than because of internal shortcomings of the system. “We were just too kind to everyone”, the bottom line here reads.

It is a psychological fact that it’s easier to believe what we want to believe. Yet I think that the participants of the forum are a lot better in filtering information than average Russians or Finns are. It’s just that some of them have firmly decided on a stance, e.g. that everyone wants to ruin Russia in order to overtake its natural resources will indeed see only enemies on all sides.

The forum had a huge psychological effect on me. That is because I wanted to become a part of the mass, I wanted to learn how to think as the others think, feel as they feel. Thus my aim wasn’t to promote and fight for my own views but to push them in the back of my head and embrace the incoming information as the truth.

Partially my little experiment was successful: I do look at the work of U.S.-financed NGOs a lot more critically now and even support the law about “foreign agents” (although I still think that the exact wording of the law should be different). I basically support the suverenity of Russia in their internal policy-making (e.g. the international LGBT movement shouldn’t embark on a war against Putin), I want to have lots of children and I get good chills when I hear the national anthem.

Also I think that Putin is not the worst thing that has ever happened to Russia. I now understand what a difficult task it is, managing Russia taking into account the sphere of really serious problems that it faces today. When he came to answer our questions I was sitting some 20 metres from him and, well, perhaps it was the yellow shirt and the casual pose, but I actually got quite good vibes of him. Compared to, say, Zhirinovski or Churov, the head of the federal electoral committee. I do think he’s trying to do what he thinks best for Russia. The reason he thinks a certain way about certain things is, well, because the information that reaches him is very different from that that reaches the Finnish public, for example.

I was talking about gay rights with a new friend of mine. He was backing him argument that was against to something he had read about an American boy that was raised by a Lesbian couple and that had stated that “his psychis was ruined because he didn’t understand what father even means”. My counterargument was about “all the children who are fine”. Another example: a girl was telling that gay pride marches should be banned because most of the population opposes to them. But why do they? It’s because the media portrayal, once again. When they look at Navalny they see a man who’s betrayed the Motherland and sold it to the Americans. When they think of “Golos” they think of the American corporations trying to make revolution happen in Russia. When they see British Council they imagine blood-thirsty British capitalists  brain-washing brain-washing their children.

Instead of promoting debate about what’s best for Russia those who organised the fosum dividided the world into patriots and anti-patriots, into friends and enemies, into black and white… And I decided that my place isn’t perhaps in Russia after all.

Odd thoughts about Putin & civil society

I’m back in St. Petersburg and I have been planning to write something for two weeks now. The summer of St. Petersburg 2.0. is very different from the last year’s edition. In fact, the course of events hasn’t changed drastically. Navalny’s about to follow Pussy Riot behing the bars, the gay propaganda law has become federal, the economy keeps slowing down… 2013 is a logical consequence of 2012. However, the “other side” has been making progress, too. The Observers’ project Beautiful St. Petersburg has spread to a few other cities. The Observers’ everyday life has normalised. Active preparation to the next elections is taking place.

I shall tell about everything some other day, in the meantime, if you’re bored, you can follow my stream of thought about the development of civil society in Russia during Putin’s era:

Civil Society in Russia in the 2000s

Loosely connects to the ideas put forward in Sarah Henderson’s Civil Society in Russia: State Society Relations in the post-Yeltsin Era, Slavic Review (2012)

Although traditionally the role of civil society as an element opposing to state power and thus consolidating democracy is highlighted, in fact the two often work in co-operation. The state often actively shapes the civil society throught the array of legislative regulations, running a policy machinary that creates a bridge between the authorities and the NGO activities, allocating funds and defining public rhetoric. In Western democracies, civil society and the state live in symbiosis, where both actors rely on the support or the other.

During Yeltsin years in the 1990s, the state was indifferent towards the NGOs. There was no funding available for them, the legislation was drawn hastily and indifferently and although the NGOs could function, the lack of public interest (citizens had far more important things to worry about, e.g. survival) meant that they were mainly funded from abroad. The internation donors had specific ideas to what the Russian civil society should look like and what rights were to be promoted. Traditionally Russian civil organisations would focus on the mere survival of the vulnerable groups, rather than th LGBT right, for example. Thus the locals were often alienated and suspicious of the incoming “builders of democracy”.

Generally speaking, civil society was not on the list of priorities for Yeltsin nor the citizens. When Putin ascended to power, a lot of this changed. The NGO legislation was redrafted and the state took up a new role, of “the vigilent big brother”. At the same time as the power vertical was erected and the state was centralised, sovereign democracy and statism became the leading ideologies that also affected the NGOs and the civil society. In Putin’s vision, Russia was to become a strong state supported by a strong, unified society. Unified does of course not mean homogenous, but it complies that any action that could pose a threat to the order of the state should be rejected and annihilated. This is why Khodorkovsky’s Open Russia was dismantled and why the Observers, by openly questioning the legitimacy of the authorities, will not receive state funding.

Putin’s Russia operates on the basis of rule by law, not rule of law like “normal” democracies. What’s best for Russia is translated into laws. Demographic crisis? Fight “untraditional” family models. Foreigners meddling with your internal affairs? Restrict their capability to fund fake NGOs that are in fact only facades for spying and plotting a coup d’etat. The essential question, however, is the following: who knows what’s best for Russia? Perhaps Putin did indeed save the Russian Federation by acting before it was too late (unlike the authoritarian leaders of Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan who were overthrown in the colour revolutions). The people came out to the squares to protest because they were told to do so by the opposition, which mainly consisted of NGOs, supported by international donors.

There’s a dilemma: Navalny is, basically, acting on a good cause, as are Golos and Observers, but the fact that they openly declare anti-static staements is what makes them enemies of the state. Money equals power – donors always have some power over the recepients, because the latter become dependent on the former. And if the recipient does for some reason not act according to the donor’s demands, the donor might feel indifferent, assaulted or revengeous in return. “If you’re not with us, you’re among us.” Of course, everything will be fine if you leave politics out of your agenda. It goes without saying, that if the NGO’s raison d’etre is to overthrow the present government or to significally change the course of events, they should be dismantled for the people’s sake. Environmentalists and the activists of Krasivyi Peterburg are somewhat harmless, as long as they don’t get too judgemental and critical of the authorities, e.g. “for not doing their job” or “stealing the people’s money”. After that, the more patriotic and supportive of the ideas of “suverene decoracy” you get, the better, the more support you will gain from the state. The rights or the disabled? Good. Orphans? Well done! WW2 veterans? Even better! In fact, it is fully logical that Putin’s state prefers to support sport clubs rather than a LGBT movement.

In 2013, the role of the NGOs is to present the avant-garde of the civil society of tomorrow: strong, healthy, patriotic Russians that have not been brainwashed by Western ideas; the Russian culture is, after all, superior to the Western one. Those NGOs that understand their task of “tomorrow’s Russia” will get all the support the state can provide. If they, on the other hand, promote idiotic ideas or possibly dangerous ideas, they deserve to be excluded and possibly eradicated from the Russian public sphere. Generally speaking, open criticism is not allowed, because it might affect the public faith in the authorities.

Promoting LGBT rights in Russia would be the same as promoting Communism in Finland. In fact, it is interesting to compare Putin’s Russia to the Finland of 1930s, where those who promoted Communism were symbolically escorted to the Eastern border of the country (muilutukset). Communism was viewed as an alien ideology, possibly dangerous to the survival of the Finnish state. Any state has a natural wish for self-protection and, essentially, survival. I do not question Putin’s love for Russia. In fact, he probably wanted to return to power because he couldn’t trust the job to be done by anyone else. He has a plan for creating a better Russia and he won’t let anyone stop it. But the question remains – is he right? Is his vision for Russia’s future better than Navalny’s or the Communists’?

“Активная гражданская позиция” по-русски

Активисты движения. Copyright “Раздельный сбор”, Приморский район.

Разделим стекло. Copyright “Раздельный сбор”, Приморский район.

My moment of fame! “Двойка куда?” Copyright “Раздельный сбор”, Приморский район.

На этих выходных я приняла участие на два мероприятия в городе Санкт-Петербург. В пятницу я посетила детский дом, а в субботу – помогла активистам общественной организации “Мусора.Больше.Нет.” в разедении мусора в Приморском районе. Вот хочу вам немного рассказать о моих впечатлениях на счет этих акции.

Чтобы стать волонтером в детский дом, мне оказалось, вообще нет легко. Наивно я думала, что прибывший в Петербург, мне хватит просто найти контакты на какой-то детский дом, позвонить им и рассказать, что я хочу стать волонтером, и все. Все, как раз, оказалось сложновато. Только с помощью знакомого, который является волонтером в одном из детских домов, мне получилось получить разрешение прийти к ним помочь. Что-то связано с тем, что я иностранка, а что-то с тем, что всё взаймодействие с детьми чётко контролируется, и людей к ним пускать просто так нелзья. К счастью все в конце концов получилось, и так в субботу я приехала в договоренный детский дом чтобы поиграть с детьми после обеда, когда они как раз отдыхают на улице. К сожалению, фотографирование этих детей категорически запрещено, и о детях и даже об этом детском доме я должна рассказать анонимно, что, на самом деле, очевидно.

Это было мой первый раз в детском доме. У нас в Финляндии классических детских домов не осталось; есть, конечно, каких-то учреждений для детей, у которых родители не способны им заниматься, но дети в этих институтах живут только временно, так как для них в конечном счете найдутся приемные семьи. Страна же все-таки маленькая, социальное государство. Я знаю, что в России в последнее время много говорят о проблемах этой системы (“Финские соцработници украдут наших детей!”), но я все-таки считаю что она, в множестве случаев, работает так как надо. Для более подробней дискуссии прямо сейчас нет пора. В общем, нужно заметить, что в Финляндии стать волонтером в детский дом невозможно, с детьми там общаются только квалифицированные воспитатели.

Сонце светило когда я вошла в двор, где меня встретила старший воспитатель. Она привела меня к детям, добавляя, что других волонтеров-то сегодня нет. Я, конечно нервничала – у меня опыта с работы с детьми вообще нет. Тем не менее, все было прекрасно! Дети, 4–6-летние, сразу же подбегли ко мне, спрашивали, как меня зовут. Это было для меня первый шок, так как я ожидала, что дети будут грустными (они же не могут быть дома у родителей, что бы могло быть хуже для ребенка!) или даже злобными. А нет! Они были очень активны, играли со мной мячиком, или я им помогла кататься на велосипеде… Один малыш мне очень много всего рассказывал, но к сожалению я не поняла, у меня же русский не родной и у него пока не все зубы выросли… Самым впечаляющим был момент, когда 5-летняя девушка меня попросила, чтобы я пошла с ней пописать, а я вообще не знала, как мне ей помочь! Или когда совершенно незнакомые дети меня держали за руку или меня обнимали. У меня нет опыта того, как себя ведут финские дети, а все-таки мне кажется, что они просто так чужого человека не обнимают, я в детстве даже со своими родителями крайне редко обнималась, и моя 20-летняя сестра до сих пор зачувствует себя очень неловко, когда я ее обнимаю. А эти дети – такие открыты, улыбающие, отлично себя ведущие… Никак я бы не могла догадаться, что они в детском доме живут. Воспитатели, так само, не потвердили мои стереотипы. Они были приятны и было заметно, что работа там им нравится. Когда детей уже собирали поспать и я собиралась поехать обратно на работу, воспитатели мне сказали, что возможно будет еще приходить. Я очень обрадовалась! Когда я в офисе рассказала о своих впечатлениях, одна коллега даже сказала, что хочет на следущий раз пойти со мной. Великолепно!

Другая форма гражданской деятельности, на что я приняла участие, состоилась с разделения мусора. В каждую субботу, активисты движения “Мусора.Больше.Нет” собираются в каждом районе города, чтобы провести акцию “Раздельный сбор”. Суть проста – люди им привезут мусор (стекло, пластик) и они его разделят и перешлут на переработку. В соцсете я случайно о них узнала и решила пойти посмотреть чем ребята там занимаются. Тот факт, что в России мусор не разберут, меня шокировал когда я первый раз посещала Петербург 5 лет назад, но с тих пор я уже к тому привыкла. В Финляндии, так как и в многих странах Европы хоть частичное разделение мусора нормально. Я, вегетарианка и бывшая хиппи, серёзно отношусь к этой темате, и мне было приятно заметить, что в России тоже есть люди, которые интересуются экологическими вопросами и готовы самы организоваться и начинать пропагандировать за решение проблемы переработки отходов. Мне кажется, что в Финляндии жители уже настолько привыкли на то, что государство или городская администрация все делает для них, что они стали немножко пассивными.

Вот и пришла на означенное место и сказала: “Привет, меня зовут Кристина, пришла тут вам помочь.” В жизни я бы такого в Финляндии не сделала! А тут, как раз, девушка мне сказала “отлично” и отправила меня к активистам, разбирающие стекло. Там молодой человек в килте мне дал рукавицы и сказал, что как надо делать. Вот так и приятно провела пополудние, общаясь с активистами движения о будущем переработки отходов в Санкт-Петербурге. Они признали, что проводение такой акции только раз в месяц очень мало, но для меня было приятно заметить, что они этим вопросом интересуются и занимаются “просто так”. Я пошла домой с хорошим настроением и с многими новыми идеями… Действительно, меня впечатлило активность этих людей, то, что они все делают самы.

С научного пункта видения меня очень интересует процесс формирования граждонского общества в России и в других посткоммунистических странах. Тот, что я видела (и во что я приняла участие) на этих выходных мне показало, что не все так плохо как говорят ученые. Конечно, люди с “активной гражданской позицией” пока явно в меньшинстве, а все-таки они есть, все-таки они организуются и занимаются решением важного им вопроса. В Финляндии тоже существует множество гражданских движений, но мне кажется, что им все… “проще”. Не сложно получить финансирование от государства, городской администрации или Евросоюза. В пинципе в стране и так все хорошо, такой нужды для гражданской деятельности нет. А России, с другой страны, надо действительно верить в свою идею, одномышленников найти сложно, а получить финансирование еще сложнее… А все-таки, люди, молодцы, этим занимаются. Я с ними!